INTRODUCTION
In June 2012, Circuit Attorney Jennifer M. Joyce prosecuted a nearly twenty-year-old "cold case" involving the rape of a young girl. 1 Both before and during the trial, Joyce published several "tweets" about the case on her official Twitter 2 account. 3 One week before the trial, just a few days before jury selection began, she posted, "David Polk trial next week. DNA hit linked him to 1992 rape of 11 yr old girl. 20 yrs later, victim now same age as prosecutor." 4 Joyce posted two additional tweets during the trial, one restating the charges against Polk 5 and another discussing her sentiments about defending child rapists. 6 Then, after the close of evidence, once jury deliberations began, Joyce posted, "Jury now has David Polk case. I hope the victim gets justice, even though 20 years late." 7 Once evidence of Joyce's social media activity came to light, the defendant moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively, to strike the jury panel. 8 Joyce defended her posts, stating that in addition to preserving a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, her position as a prosecutor and public servant requires that she keep the public informed about criminal matters and events that affect public safety. 9 Further, each tweet was based on publicly available information about the trial. 10 The Missouri Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the defendant's motion because the court found no evidence that any juror was aware of or swayed by Joyce's posts. 11 Nevertheless, the question remains: Were Joyce's posts ethical? Should Joyce and other prosecuting attorneys be allowed to use social media to discuss pending cases and other aspects of their role as prosecutors? Or, do the risks of harm to the defendant and to the integrity of the justice system outweigh the potential benefits of engendering a more informed citizenry?
The growth of new media, particularly social media, 12 has facilitated information sharing within a wide range of contexts, including the law. 13 4. Id. 5. Id. 6. Id. ("I have respect for attys who defend child rapists. Our system of justice demands it, but I couldn't do it. No way, no how.").
7. Id. Joyce also tweeted after the jury delivered a guilty verdict, stating, "Finally, justice. David Polk guilty of the 1992 rape of 11 yr old girl. DNA cold case. Brave victim now the same age as prosecutor" and "Aside from DNA, David Polk's victim could identify him 20 years later. Couldn't forget the face of the man who terrorized her." Id. 10. Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 695. Specifically, each tweet was based on information contained in a felony complaint and a probable cause statement, which had been filed as part of the public record prior to Joyce's posts. See id. Thus, no confidentiality issues were raised. See id.
11. Id. at 696. 12. Social media has been defined as web-based services that enable individuals to create public or semi-public profiles and communicate with others using the system. See Indeed, social media 14 has a great potential to influence individuals' knowledge and perspectives 15 in a more extensive way than has traditional or "old" media. 16 The expansion of social media thus raises questions about how lawyers may properly use these new technological platforms in such a way that comports with constitutional restraints and ethical rules. 17 Within the criminal justice system, the use of social media is particularly troublesome when the content or nature of the information conveyed biases jurors, unnecessarily harms the defendant, misleads the public, or otherwise tarnishes the sanctity of the judicial process. 18 Restricting extrajudicial statements, however, may burden freedom of speech and provide for a less transparent and open justice system. 19 This tension is particularly reflected in prosecutors' use of social media. 20 Although ethical rules govern extrajudicial statements 21 made by all attorneys or personnel associated with a particular matter, 22 prosecutors' extrajudicial statements are subject to additional restrictions 23 due to the prevailing view that prosecutors' statements are likely to influence the views of prospective or active jurors, 24 especially in criminal cases. 25 Although the rules of professional conduct 26 14. Although the focus of this Note is on the effects of social media on prosecutors' speech, much of the analysis applies to all forms of electronic media.
15. See St. Eve et al., supra note 13, at 67; see also HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at xiiixvi.
16. See infra Part I.C. For the purposes of this Note, traditional, or "old," media refers to print newspapers, radios, and television broadcasts, while "new" media refers to social media, websites, and other online communications.
17. prosecutors' First Amendment rights and the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial, 28 the use of social media complicates this balance because it magnifies both the benefits and the risks of harm associated with prosecutors' extrajudicial statements. 29 This Note addresses how social media raises new concerns regarding whether existing restraints on prosecutors' speech about pending criminal matters are sufficient to prevent undue harm to the defendant and the justice system at large. Part I provides an overview of the issues concerning extrajudicial speech and its impact on the judicial process, the rules and standards developed to help resolve these issues, as well as the differences between traditional media-for which the rules were developed-and social media. Part II highlights instances of prosecutors' recent use of social media in official and unofficial capacities. Part II also discusses the competing motivations behind prosecutors' social media activity as well as how social media both increases the benefits and exacerbates the risks of prosecutors' extrajudicial statements. Finally, Part III argues that the magnified harms presented by prosecutors' extrajudicial speech on social media necessitate new restraints to reduce the risks of harm to the defendant, the judicial process, and public perception of the legal profession.
I. OLD PROBLEM, OLD RULES, AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Because prosecutors' extrajudicial statements have been a longstanding concern due to their potential to influence the outcome of an adjudicatory proceeding, organizations like the American Bar Association (ABA) have developed ethical rules and standards to promote fairness and protect the rights of defendants in pending matters. Part I.A of this section provides an overview of the issues regarding extrajudicial statements in criminal cases. Part I.B then addresses existing restraints on prosecutors' extrajudicial statements that were developed in the context of traditional media, including radio and print journalism. Finally, Part I.C assesses the differences between social media and traditional media and discusses the rise of social media as a news source, thereby raising the question of whether existing restraints are sufficient to protect the integrity of the judicial process in the new media age.
A. A Longstanding Problem: Extrajudicial Statements in Criminal Trials
Lawyers' statements to the media about pending cases have been of concern for over a century. 30 lawyers' interactions with newspapers, radio, and television stations. 31 As discussed at length by many legal scholars, 32 the basic premise behind the problem of lawyers' extrajudicial statements about pending matters involves a tension between the First and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 33 The First Amendment prohibits the government from infringing on freedom of speech or of the press, 34 while the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 35 These rights may come into conflict when members of the jury are exposed to statements made by an attorney affiliated with the case. 36 In rendering a verdict in a criminal case, the jury must rely exclusively on admissible evidence offered at trial. 37 Statements made before and during trial can expose prospective or acting jurors to prejudicial information about the defendant, thereby affecting the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 38 Where attorneys' speech goes unrestrained, there is a risk that statements regarding inadmissible evidence or attorneys' personal media during the pendency of a trial."); see also 289, 290 (2010) . In general, pre-trial statements are more likely to prejudice the proceeding because the jury has not yet been empaneled and instructed to avoid news coverage of the case. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 102. Although measures are taken to prevent empaneled jurors from obtaining extraneous information about the case, these measures are not always effective. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 56 (discussing ways to improve the efficacy of jury instructions).
perceptions of the proceedings will reach and influence the jury. 39 Attorneys' unique role in the judicial process, including their access to confidential information, "bestows 'a degree of credibility to their speech' above that of an ordinary citizen" or the press, which makes it more likely that their statements will affect a given proceeding. 40 Although this is true for prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike, prosecutors' extrajudicial statements are of particular concern in the free speech/fair trial debate 41 because prosecutors "speak with 'the inherent authority of the government.'" 42 In other words, given the nature of the prosecutorial role, prosecutors' extrajudicial statements are considered particularly likely to influence a pending proceeding. 43 At the same time, however, prosecutors' extrajudicial statements may also provide the public with important information about public safety and the functioning of the judicial system within their community. 44 As prosecutors are considered public servants who are accountable to their constituents, 45 some scholars have contended that prosecutors have an obligation to inform the public about how they are managing their responsibilities, which may include providing information about pending matters. 46 Indeed, prosecutors' speech about pending cases can provide the public with important information regarding the operation of the justice system and other matters of public policy. 47 This type of extrajudicial speech can be quite valuable to the community because it can "educate the public about the legal system generally or regarding specific aspects of the law." 48 It can also assure members of the public that the prosecutor's office is actively responding to the needs of the community. 49 
B. Striking a Balance: Current Restraints on Prosecutors' Extrajudicial Speech
Professional legal organizations like the ABA have struck a balance between attorneys' freedom of speech and the defendant's right to a fair trial. 50 Since 1908, the ABA has promulgated rules and standards of ethical and professional conduct, including rules governing attorneys' extrajudicial statements about pending matters. 51 The earliest rules were developed out of concern for attorneys' published statements in newspapers, or old media. 52 Although these rules have been periodically revised, 53 the existing rules and standards do not distinguish between extrajudicial statements made via old media, such as newspapers and television, and those made using new media, particularly social media. 54 Part I.B.1 of this section addresses Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), which governs trial publicity for all lawyers. Part I.B.2 examines ABA Model Rule 3.8(f), which provides additional restraints on prosecutors' extrajudicial speech in criminal cases. Part I.B.3 discusses ABA standards, particularly those governing prosecutors' extrajudicial statements.
Finally, Part I.B.4 provides background on other restraints on prosecutors' extrajudicial statements, such as employer guidelines and judge-imposed gag orders. Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules strikes a balance between the right of free speech and the right to a fair trial. 55 On the one hand, Rule 3.6(a) prohibits lawyers working on a particular matter from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially affecting the proceeding. 56 This restriction extends to other lawyers who work for the same law firm or government agency but are not working on the matter. 57 However, Rule 3.6 also delineates a safe harbor provision that allows limited disclosure in situations that are unlikely to pose a substantial risk of materially prejudicing a proceeding, such as the release of information contained in a public record or a statement that an investigation into a particular matter is taking place. 58 As such, Model Rule 3.6 provides prosecutors and other attorneys with a constitutional limit on extrajudicial statements regarding pending matters on which they or members of their office are working, while also permitting some extrajudicial speech about those matters. 59 2. ABA Model Rule 3.8
Although Rule 3.6 applies broadly to all lawyers, Rule 3.8 provides additional ethical obligations for prosecutors in criminal cases. 60 Recognizing that prosecutors' extrajudicial statements about pending matters can impose reputational harm on the accused, the ABA adopted 55 . See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). 56. See id. r. 3.6(a) ("A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."). Comment 5 to Rule 3.6 provides a list of certain types of information that are more likely to materially prejudice a judicial proceeding, such as information relating to "the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect . . . or witness" or "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration." Id. r. 3.6 cmt. in 2013, the standards do not focus on the differences between old and new media, or the effect that these differences may have on pending cases, the reputations of the accused, or public perception of the legal profession. 70 Nevertheless, the standards seek to promote transparency and confidence in the criminal justice system, while also maintaining the integrity of the judicial proceedings. 71 Like the Model Rules, 72 the Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse indicate that lawyers involved in a criminal matter shall not make any extrajudicial statements that may have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicatory proceeding or "unnecessarily heightening public condemnation" of the accused. 73 The standards further provide that attorneys should avoid making statements that negatively impact public perception of and respect for the judicial process. 74 Additionally, like Model Rule 3.8, 75 the Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse provide guidelines that are specific to prosecutors. 76 The standards outline topics that prosecutors should avoid discussing when making public statements about a pending case, 77 while also providing an illustrative list of subjects that are usually permissible, such as statements that are necessary to inform the public about prosecutorial action and statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. 78 
Other Restraints
In addition to the ABA Model Rules and Standards, other measures may be used to restrain prosecutors' speech. 79 Many prosecutors' offices provide additional guidance and training regarding media relations and statements to the public. 80 Like the ABA Model Rules, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual (the Manual) aims to strike a balance between defendants' right to a fair trial, the value of a free press, and the public's right to information. 82 Chapter 1-7.000, entitled "Media Relations," provides guidance similar to that of the ABA Model Rules by indicating what type of information is "disclosable" 83 and, conversely, what type of information should be withheld from the public due to the likelihood that such information could influence a pending proceeding. 84 The Manual indicates that a press release is "the usual method to release public information to the media" and that press conferences should be limited to only the "most significant and newsworthy actions." 85 Where there exists a "substantial public interest" in a pending matter, the guidelines further provide that extrajudicial statements conveyed to the press should be confined to the public record 86 and should not contain any information that has a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding. 87 The guidelines also acknowledge that in some instances "the community needs to be reassured" that action is being taken in a particular matter, in which case public commentary confirming that an investigation is underway may be necessary "to protect the public interest." 88 Judges also have the ability to restrict trial participants' extrajudicial speech by issuing gag orders 89 to prevent attorneys or others from publicly discussing the case. 90 Although the standards for issuing gag orders are not uniform, 91 gag orders are typically reserved for only the most newsworthy 90. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 106-07; Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10. "Many judges, however, are reluctant to grant [gag] orders in light of the First Amendment." HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 106-07.
91. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 128-30; Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10. Specifically, some courts issue gag orders where "there is a reasonable likelihood that trial participants' extrajudicial statements would preclude a fair trial." Minnefor, supra note 30, at 128. Other courts, however, impose gag orders "if [trial participants'] comments pose a serious and cases where the danger of unfair prejudice is particularly substantial. 92 Thus, judges have some discretion to impose further restrictions on prosecutors' extrajudicial speech when necessary to promote fairness. 93 
C. The Rise of Social Media
In determining whether existing restraints are sufficient in the new media age, it is important to consider how new media, particularly social media, has impacted the dissemination of and access to information about criminal cases and other news. Part I.C.1 addresses the ways in which social media differs from traditional media, while Part I.C.2 discusses how the public is increasingly using social media as a news source.
How Social Media Differs from Traditional Media
Social media is distinct from traditional media in several ways. Prior to the rise of social media and other forms of electronic communications, individuals who sought to communicate with the public had to rely on traditional media, namely print newspapers, radio, and television. 94 As these media outlets could not-and still cannot-provide news coverage for every story, and instead elect to selectively report on only the most newsworthy of events, it was quite difficult for ordinary persons and government officials alike to make public statements that would reach a large audience using traditional means. 95 Social media and other internet resources, however, enable individuals to communicate immediately and continuously with a large audience with little to no effort or cost. 96 Further, individuals can disseminate messages imminent threat of interference with a fair trial" or where there is a "clear and present danger" of such interference. Id. at 128-29.
92. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 126-27. Indeed, generally gag orders are only issued when the measure is narrowly tailored to restrict the likelihood of prejudice and is the least restrictive means of doing so. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10 & n.3.
93. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10. In addition to restricting the ability of prosecutors and other trial participants to make extrajudicial statements, judges can also take steps to restrict the effect of statements that have already been made or may be made in the future. of their own creation without having to wait for traditional media outlets to provide coverage and without having their statements truncated. 97 Because statements on social media can be disseminated instantly with the simple click of a button, 98 social media posts are more likely to be impulsive and unrestrained than are statements made via traditional media, thereby leading individuals to "say things that they would never say in a direct, in-person exchange." 99 Another difference between social media and traditional media is the amount of scrutiny that is accorded to statements prior to publication. 100 Reports and broadcasts on traditional media typically involve extensive research, fact checking, and editing prior to the issuance of any publication. 101 Inflammatory allegations and other editorializing may be truncated, or even fully omitted, in the final publication or broadcast. 102 In the criminal justice context, this type of traditional oversight substantially reduces the likelihood that one's statements could prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. 103 Further, reporters rarely rely on just one source. 104 Instead, reporters typically solicit information from multiple sources, select some of the information from different sources, and convey information from different sources side by side in one article or report. 105 As such, traditional media communications tend to be the product of thorough and rational deliberation. 106 In contrast, social media and other forms of electronic communications are like "open mikes," 107 where individuals necessarily act as their own editors. 108 Indeed, all posts made on social media are unmediated and 97. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 61. 98. See Younkins, supra note 95, at 229; Hamer, supra note 96. 99. Younkins, supra note 95, at 230. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "online disinhibition effect." Id. "The effect operates in two directions; sometimes people will reveal personal information about themselves online that they would not share in a oneon-one conversation . . . and sometimes people will act out online and make statements, including . . . rants, that they would not make directly . As a result, individuals who read news on social media likely have greater difficulty obtaining balanced information because they must search through "a fog of brief snippets of first-person blog-speak" to piece together the news story on their own. 113 The comparative lack of oversight also indicates that social media provides greater opportunities for individuals to act deceptively by posting false information or by commenting behind a perceived cloak of anonymity. 114 Thus, the ability to use social media to provide one-sided information has improved one's ability "to inform, persuade and galvanize individuals." 115 Social media is also distinct from traditional media due to its expansive reach. Traditional media broadcasts and reports are usually confined to a particular geographical region or local community. 116 The reach of social media, however, is seemingly infinite. 117 Indeed, public statements on social media can reach hundreds, thousands, or even millions of people in a matter of seconds. 118 Finally, social media differs from traditional media because social media posts are more enduring and obtainable. 120 Statements published in print newspapers from months prior are significantly less permanent or accessible because individuals do not tend to retain newspapers for extended periods of time 121 and access to newspaper archives often requires a membership fee. 122 Similarly, a statement made in a face-to-face interview "lasts only as long as the words are being spoken," barring any recordings of the conversation. 123 However, a post on a social media website never disappears; 124 even a deleted post can still linger, either because it was "shared" by other social media users 125 or because it still exists somewhere in cyberspace. 126 Thus, statements made via social media from months prior are readily available to those who seek them out by searching the internet.
The Increasing Popularity of Social Media as a News Source
The differences between traditional media and social media are particularly important within the context of the legal profession because social media websites have become increasingly popular places to obtain and discuss the news, 127 ease of access to these various digital media fora, the public has developed a voracious appetite for near-instant media coverage of a wide variety of events, including law enforcement investigations and criminal trials. 129 According to a Pew Research Center study, half of American Facebook and Twitter users obtain news through Facebook or Twitter. 130 Furthermore, 50 percent of social media users have shared or reposted news stories, images, or videos on social media websites while 46 percent have used social media platforms to discuss issues or events in the news. 131 Others post in the comment section of news articles and blog posts. 132 Consequently, as people repost or share news on social media websites, social media users are becoming increasingly exposed to the news. 133 Such exposure may occur incidentally while individuals use social media on their computers or smartphones for purposes other than to follow the news. 134 The growth of social media as a tool for actively and passively obtaining news has directly impacted criminal trials. 135 Indeed, the increasing use of social media has greatly magnified the "opportunity to exercise persuasion and influence upon jurors." 136 Because surfing social media sites or the internet at large can expose jurors to prejudicial and inadmissible (discussing how "social media exploded with outrage and calls for demonstrations" after a grand jury declined to indict a white police officer in the death of a black man, Eric Garner, whom the officer had put in a chokehold during an arrest for selling untaxed cigarettes) information about the case to which they are assigned, 137 some judges and court systems have adopted ways to curb jurors' internet usage to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. 138 The most common response has been improving jury instructions. 139 The most effective instructions not only specify what constitutes social media but also explain why jurors should not use social media to discuss or research the case and the effect of such conduct on the fairness of the trial. 140 Though jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions, there have been instances where jurors have used the internet to discuss or research the case while the matter is still pending, thereby raising due process concerns. 141 II. SHOULD PROSECUTORS USE SOCIAL MEDIA?
As social media has made it easier for anyone to share and obtain information, 142 it is relatively unsurprising that some prosecutors have used social media to discuss cases and other aspects of their work in both official and unofficial capacities. 143 This, in turn, has raised conflicting opinions about whether prosecutors should be allowed to use social media to discuss pending matters and other aspects of their work. Part II.A of this section highlights ways in which prosecutors have used social media to discuss pending cases and other aspects of their role as prosecutors. Part II.B addresses the competing motivations that may influence prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements. Finally, Part II.C assesses how social media has increased both the benefits and harmful risks of prosecutors' extrajudicial statements.
A. Prosecutors' Use of Social Media
As social media usage has expanded, so too has the use of social media by prosecutors and other attorneys. 144 138. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 54-55 (discussing various measures to prevent social media usage, including "(1) requiring jurors to take an oath; (2) penalizing jurors; (3) investigating jurors; (4) allowing juror questions; and (5) improving jury instructions"). Relatedly, judges have also taken steps to dissuade jurors from using social media to publish information about the case or to contact attorneys, the defendant, witnesses, and fellow jurors. 148. See infra Part II.A.1-2. It should be noted that prosecutors are not the only members of the legal profession who have been scrutinized for their social media activity. Civil attorneys, criminal defense attorneys, and judges have similarly fallen prey to skirting ethical rules or otherwise arousing concern due to their use of social media to discuss matters pertaining to their work in the legal profession. See, e.g., In re McCool, 2015-B-0284, 2015 WL 3972684 (La. June 30, 2015) (disbarring an attorney who used Twitter and an online petition in an attempt to influence the outcome of pending child custody cases by directing readers to contact the judges involved with those cases and ask the judges to review evidence that they had declined to consider); Browning, supra note 12, at 223 (discussing how a judge declared a mistrial after a public defender, whose client was facing murder charges, posted a photograph of her client's leopard print underwear on Facebook with the caption "proper attire for trial," in addition to a statement in which she seemed to question her client's innocence); Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising From Lawyers' Use of (and Refusal to Use) Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179, 193 (2011) (describing how a judge was removed from the bench after evidence came to light that she had pseudonymously posted more than eighty comments on a local news website, many of which pertained to cases that were tried before her, including a high-profile murder case).
149. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105-06 (discussing prosecutors who have created Facebook or Twitter accounts to post information in an official capacity); Amanda Marrazzo, Prosecutors Vary in Use of Social Media, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-27/news/ct-tl-lake-county-social-media20130328_1_social-media-twitter-account-facebook-page (discussing how some prosecutorial offices in Chicago created official Facebook and Twitter accounts to communicate with the public and promote transparency by publishing public information such as press releases, indictments, and information regarding public safety) [http://perma.cc/L46V-GBKQ]. Defense attorneys have also created social media pages to communicate with the public about pending cases. See, e.g., HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 106-08 (explaining how defense attorney Mark O'Mara used social media to communicate with the public during his representation of George Zimmerman when he was tried and acquitted of second-degree murder for the death of Trayvon Martin). Even some state court systems and bar associations have begun using social media to provide case updates. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 131. of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), represent the office as a whole, 150 while others represent the appointed or elected prosecutor individually. 151 Although social media is certainly not the only means through which prosecutors inform the public, 152 prosecutors and their offices are increasingly using social media to publish information about pending charges, 153 guilty pleas, 154 verdicts, 155 sentencing, 156 office initiatives, 157 and other topics of public interest. 158 Though the majority of posts appear to satisfy professional and ethical standards, some prosecutors go further by disseminating their personal views on crime, the law, and the justice system in ways that may seem informal and arguably less professional than statements made through 150 traditional media. 159 This may cause members of the public "to question or lose faith in the criminal justice system as a whole." 160 District Attorney Ray Larson of Lexington, Kentucky, for example, uses Twitter and Facebook to communicate with his constituents. 161 His account name is "Ray the D.A.," a phrase that is "emblazoned on a superman-like avatar" featured at the top of his page on both websites. 162 Some of his posts are informative, such as those that alert the public of crime trends in the community 163 or provide parents with information regarding how to monitor their children's internet usage. 164 Although prosecutors' official use of social media has rarely been of concern in criminal cases, there have been a few instances in which defendants have argued for striking the jury panel, dismissing the indictment, or granting a new trial based on a prosecutor's improper extrajudicial statements on social media. 166 Typically, these challenges have failed because the defendant was unable to prove that the statements reached the jury and influenced the outcome of the proceeding. 167 In Minnesota v. Usee, 168 for example, the prosecuting attorney made comments about the trial on her public Facebook page before the case was submitted to the jury for deliberations. 169 Specifically, she posted a comment about one of the jurors and indicated that, by prosecuting the case, she was "keep[ing] the streets of Minneapolis safe from the Somalias [sic] ." 170 The defendant, a Somali immigrant 171 who was tried and convicted of assault and murder charges, 172 moved for a new trial, partly on the grounds that the prosecuting attorney's social media activity amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. 173 However, because the defendant did not present any evidence that indicated any members of the jury had been exposed to the prosecutors' social media activity, and the judge had instructed the jury not to conduct any internet research into the case or into anyone involved with the case, the court denied the defendant's motion. 174 Similarly, in Missouri v. Polk, 175 the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case with prejudice after prosecuting attorney Jennifer M. Joyce repeatedly used Twitter to make public comments about the case throughout the course of the trial. 176 The basis for the denial was the absence of evidence indicating that Joyce's posts had denied the defendant his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 177 Moreover, the trial court judge had provided jury instructions prohibiting the jurors from researching the case or using social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter during the pendency of the case. 178 Additionally, prior to being selected, none of the jurors indicated that he or she "followed" the prosecutor's posts on social media when asked during voir dire. 179 Although the court declined to determine whether Joyce's conduct amounted to a violation of the ethical rules governing extrajudicial statements by prosecutors, 180 the court seemed uncomfortable with the content of Joyce's social media activity. 181 Indeed, even though the posts were based on facts contained in the public record, 182 the court found 169 . Id. at 200-01; see also Browning, supra note 114, at 896-97. 170. Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 200. At least one commentator has stated that the prosecutor's post was "disturbing" and racially insensitive, particularly because the case took place "[i]n a city that has struggled to assimilate one of the largest concentrations of Somali immigrants in the country." Browning, supra note 114, at 898. 184 The court also expressed that the prosecutor's comments characterizing the defendant as a child rapist likely "heightened public condemnation" 185 and that Joyce's decision to make the Twitter posts immediately before and during the trial increased the risk of prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 186 Joyce subsequently issued a "Statement on Social Media" in response to the appellate court's decision. 187 She defended her tweets on the grounds that the facts underlying her statements were part of the public record and that, as a prosecutor, she had a duty to inform the public. 188 She further emphasized how social media sites like Twitter promote transparency and provide law enforcement officials with "valuable and legitimate ways . . . to inform and engage the public," thereby encouraging the public to become more proactive in securing the safety of the community. 189 In closing, Joyce expressed confidence in her office's ability to utilize social media in a way that balances the rights of the public with the rights of criminal defendants. 190 More recently, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara was criticized for extrajudicial statements made after charges were filed against Sheldon Silver, a former New York State Assembly speaker who was charged with corruption. 191 Prior to the grand jury indictment, Bharara held a press conference, issued a press release, spoke at a televised event at New York Law School, and was interviewed on a cable news station to discuss the allegations against Silver and comment broadly on corruption in New York politics. 192 Additionally, the U.S. Attorney's Office published several comments on Twitter. 193 Some of the tweets announced that Silver faced public corruption charges and provided a link to the office's press release. 194 Other tweets were more colorful: "Bharara: Silver monetized his position as Speaker of the Assembly in two principal ways & misled the public about his outside income" and "Bharara: Politicians are supposed to be on the ppl's payroll, not on secret retainer to wealthy special interests they do favors for." 195 After the grand jury issued an indictment charging Silver with honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, and extortion, Silver filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, or at least poll the grand jurors to determine if they were influenced by the extrajudicial statements. 196 Silver argued that the extrajudicial statements were prejudicial because they reflected Bharara's opinion that Silver was guilty. 197 In denying Silver's motion, the court noted that dismissing an indictment because of a defect in the grand jury proceedings is a "'drastic remedy' that is 'rarely used'" 198 and that here there was no evidence that Bharara's comments substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict Silver. 199 Nevertheless, the court indicated that certain extrajudicial statements may "blur the distinction between legitimate public commentary and improper opinion" 200 and further emphasized that " [t] his is especially true in the context of Twitter communications." 201 The court found meritless the Government's argument that Bharara's Twitter posts should be read in the context of his other extrajudicial statements, such as the press release, which arguably made it clearer that the charges against Silver were still just allegations. 202 Indeed, the court explained that the aforementioned tweets 203 did not contain links to the press release or complaint and that the Government's "argument disregards the substantial known risk that, in communicating via a platform that limits messages to 140 characters and permits readers to 'retweet' a single communication, one's statements will in fact be read in isolation." 204 
Unofficial Use of Social Media
Although public social media profiles like the ones in Minnesota v. Usee, Missouri v. Polk, and United States v. Silver 205 more naturally open prosecutors up to ethical criticism due to their accessibility, they are not "safe" from scrutiny merely because their social media profile is made private, 206 or because they engage in social media activity anonymously. 207 Some prosecutors have used social media-with and without anonymityto discuss aspects of their work, be it about the general functioning of their office or specifics about the matters on which they or members of their office are working. 208 In rare instances, such activity has attracted the attention of the courts. 209 Most notably, in 2012, the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Louisiana experienced a scandal when an investigation uncovered that at least two of the office's top deputies 210 had created multiple pseudonyms to discuss one of the office's pending cases and used inflammatory language to describe the subjects of the ongoing investigation. 211 Indeed, the deputies each had made hundreds of posts on the comments section on the website of the New Orleans Times-Picayune during the weeks leading up to the trial as well as during the trial itself. 212 The targets of some of their posts were five former officers of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) who had been convicted for their involvement in a controversial shooting and cover-up after Hurricane Katrina. 213 Specifically, the officers were accused of killing two people and injuring four others who were all unarmed at the Danziger Bridge in New Orleans. 214 The officers then planted a firearm at the scene and provided false reports about what precipitated the shootings. 215 While the matter was still pending, one prosecutor anonymously posted that the NOPD was "'corrupt' and 'ineffectual,' 'totally dysfunctional,' 'an indolent agency,' 'a joke for a long time,' and suffer[ed] from 'cultural' problems." 216 The same prosecutor also characterized one of the public and private social media] is increasingly blurred."). Maintaining a private profile whereby an individual restricts access only to approved users does not ensure that one's social media activity actually remains private. Twitter, for example, enables users to "retweet" information that is posted by other users. prospective defense witnesses as "'racist,' 'inept,' and 'delusional' and proclaimed generally that NOPD officers are 'crap.'" 217 Other comments further criticized the defendants' attorneys, defenses, witnesses, evidence, and testimony. 218 After the jury rendered a guilty verdict, evidence of the prosecutors' conduct came to light, prompting the defendants to appeal their convictions on the grounds that the prosecutors' conduct was so egregious that it warranted overturning the convictions and granting a new trial. 219 The court found in the defendants' favor in a 129-page order, which began:
With a history of unprecedented events and acts, consideration of the defendants' motion has taken the Court on a legal odyssey unlike any other. With the relatively recent advent of the age of cyberspace and social media/networking, courts have anticipated a myriad of issues and potential controversies. This Court is unaware of any case, however, wherein prosecutors acting with anonymity used social media to circumvent ethical obligations [and] professional responsibilities. . . . Hence, to the Court's knowledge, there is no case similar, in nature or scope, to this bizarre and appalling turn of events. 220 The Government contended that the comments posted about the pending trial "were neither front-page headlines nor breaking news stories; rather, they were remarkably low-profile musings of an unrecognizable citizen not known to be associated with the government, commenting beneath articles that related directly to the ongoing trial and were therefore expressly off limits to the jurors." 221 Further, there was no evidence that any jurors read the comments on the online news source or, even if they had, as to whether they attributed that information to someone with authority. 222 The court, however, determined that the prosecutors' conduct was so "egregious," "deliberate," and "offensive" that it "infected" the "integrity of the proceeding," 223 thereby rendering it impossible to "cure such a grave 217 222. See id. at 619. The court did, however, examine the jurors' responses to the pre-trial questionnaire that was administered a few weeks before the trial. See id. at 621. The seven jurors who indicated that they utilized the NOLA.com website also provided responses that indicated that they were more likely to perceive officers of the NOPD as dishonest than were the other jurors who had not visited the NOLA.com website. See id. at 621-22. The court acknowledged that there were many possible explanations for this correlation and further determined that, if questioned at an evidentiary hearing regarding whether they actually read the online comments in question, the jurors likely would be unable to recall which posts they had read or not read given that several years had passed. See id. at 622.
223. Id. at 575, 619. In determining that no demonstration of actual prejudice was required, the court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993), in which the Court indicated that in some "unusual" circumstances, prosecutorial misconduct could be so "deliberate" and "egregious" as to warrant the granting of habeas relief even where the prosecutors' conduct did not appearance of unfairness" even if the jury was not aware of or influenced by the prosecutors' statements. 224 Thus, no showing of actual prejudice was necessary to grant the defendants' motion for a new trial, and the defendants' convictions were vacated. 225 The Government appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. 226 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the "unusual" and "extraordinary" nature of the misconduct indicated that the defendants did not need to demonstrate the prejudice ordinarily required for the grant of a new trial. 227 Indeed, the court characterized the prosecutors' online comments as "bullying," analogizing the conduct to "a mob protesting outside the courthouse" 228 and determining that the commentary "breached all standards of prosecutorial ethics, [and] gave the government a surreptitious advantage in influencing public opinion, the venire panel, and the trial itself." 229 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the Government's argument that the anonymity of the posts mitigated the severity of the misconduct, 230 finding instead that "the anonymous nature of the comments . . . increase[d] their pernicious influence" 231 and that "[a]nonymity provokes irresponsibility in the speaker." 232 The court further expressed that the anonymous nature of the online posts was particularly problematic because it "gave the prosecution a tool for public castigation of the defendants that it could not have used against them otherwise" 233 and eliminated the ability to measure the extent of the improper influence on the venire panel, the jury, as well as the trial "participants' approaches to their defense, testimony, or decisions to testify." 234 substantially affect the jury's deliberations. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 575, 619. But see United States v. Jackson, 22 F. Supp. 3d 636, 645 (E.D. La. 2014) (declining to warrant the same remedy to another defendant about whom at least one member of the U.S. Attorney's Office had posted because that prosecutor's conduct was "insufficient to establish . . . a pattern, policy or practice of using online comments to bias the Grand Jurors" against this particular defendant); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976) (noting that "even pervasive, adverse publicity" does not by itself render a trial unfair).
224. In addition to anonymous posts on news sites, some prosecutors engage in unofficial use of social media by maintaining anonymous blogs. 235 Some blog to vent or provide humor. 236 Other prosecutors blog to promote transparency, at least in part, by providing information about the scope of the prosecutorial role 237 and the nature of the criminal justice system. 238 Sometimes this includes discussing high profile cases with which they and their offices are unaffiliated. 239 When it comes to their own matters, however, at least some prosecutors who blog strive to avoid discussing their pending cases. 240 articulated that they cannot blog about ongoing matters have discussed pending cases to which they have been assigned in their blog posts. 241 Although such posts typically do not contain any names, legal analysis, or discussion of the particular evidence intended to be introduced at trial, some posts seem to convey a presumption of the defendants' guilt, 242 which arguably runs afoul to the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice. 243 In addition to anonymous blogging, some prosecutors post unofficially and without authorization by way of their personal social media profiles. One assistant state prosecutor, for example, posted on his private Facebook page about his "trial from hell," characterizing the defendant as a "gang banger" and the defense attorney as a "weasel face" in a poem that he wrote to the tune of the Gilligan's Island theme song. 244 242. See, e.g., A Difficult Witness, supra note 241 (affirmatively stating that the defendant "burglarized a string of stores" even though he had yet to be convicted for such offenses); One Witness Too Many, supra note 241 (stating that four individuals "jumped and robbed a man" although they had yet to be found guilty of these charges).
243 after the start of jury deliberations but before the jury had rendered a verdict. 245 The case ultimately resulted in a mistrial for reasons unrelated to the prosecutor's social media activity. 246 Another state prosecutor made national news and ultimately resigned from her job after publishing an inflammatory post on Facebook in which she stated that the best way to handle violent demonstrations in Baltimore arising from the death of a man who died from a spinal injury sustained while in police custody was to shoot the protestors. 247
B. Prosecutors' Competing Motivations to Make Extrajudicial Statements
In evaluating what, if any, additional restraints should be put in place to restrict prosecutors' social media activity, it is important to consider why prosecutors may choose to post information or comment on social media. Prosecutors may have many different reasons for engaging in such activity, some of which may raise concerns. Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 address some of the legitimate and illegitimate motivations behind prosecutor's extrajudicial speech on social media, respectively.
Legitimate Motivations
As Circuit Attorney Joyce articulated in her Statement on Social Media, prosecutors are government officials and public servants who have an informational motive for making extrajudicial statements. 248 Thus, some prosecutors may elect to make extrajudicial statements to warn the public of certain dangers, update the public on events occurring within the prosecutor's office or justice system, or provide information about matters that may not be receiving attention from the press. 249 Additionally, the interests of justice and a fair judicial process might motivate prosecutors to correct inaccuracies in stories that are being reported in the press. 250
To make sure justice is served 250. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 149. In some situations, online reporting or "courtroom blogging" has resulted in news coverage that forsakes accuracy for expedience and newsworthiness. See Coffey, supra note 13, at 1, 18.
The natural desire to articulate one's thoughts or express one's viewpoint may also motivate prosecutors to engage in extrajudicial speech. By assuming the role of a prosecutor, one sheds neither his innate need to communicate nor his First Amendment protections. 251 Although legal professional codes limit attorneys' "freedom to vent, complain, and gripe" to a greater extent than that of the average citizen, 252 many attorneys naturally still seek to express feelings of joy and frustration regarding their day-to-day experiences. 253 
Illegitimate Motivations
Prosecutors may also have less legitimate motivations for engaging in extrajudicial speech. Reputational concerns, for example, may incentivize prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements. 254 Although federal prosecutors like U.S. Attorneys are appointed, most head prosecutors are elected. 255 Prosecutors seeking to enhance their reputation may make certain statements that demonstrate that they subscribe to a particular view on crime or that they are effectively serving the public interest. 256 Personal concerns, such as the desire to be viewed positively by the public or the press, may motivate such statements. Additionally, political pressures, such as reelection concerns or the desire to advance to a higher position, may incentivize prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements. 257 In some situations these pressures may result in a "win-at-all-costs mentality," which can encourage some prosecutors to skirt ethical rules to secure convictions that increase the likelihood of being reelected by the public or of being appointed or hired for a different job in the future. 258 Thus, some prosecutors may intentionally seek to manipulate the press and prospective or active jurors by leaking false, inadmissible, or misleading information to advance the government's case against a particular defendant. 259 Others may seek to influence the defendant, hoping that particularly extensive media coverage might entice the defendant to enter a guilty plea. 260 These influences are particularly prominent in high profile cases in which prosecutors face immense pressure to make arrests and secure convictions quickly. 261 
C. How Social Media Increases the Benefits and Exacerbates the Harms of Prosecutors' Extrajudicial Statements
As social media makes it easier for prosecutors to act on these competing motivations when deciding whether to make extrajudicial statements, 262 it is also important to consider how social media changes the effects of prosecutors' extrajudicial speech. Part II.C.1 of this section addresses the increased benefits of prosecutors' extrajudicial speech on social media while Part II.C.2 discusses how social media magnifies the harmful risks associated with prosecutors' extrajudicial statements.
Increased Benefits of Prosecutors' Extrajudicial Speech
Prosecutors' use of social media may positively impact relations between prosecutors' offices and the public at large. This section explores how prosecutors can use social media to more easily communicate with the public and provide greater transparency that may improve public perception of prosecutors.
Prosecutors' use of social media may engender a more informed citizenry. 263 As previously discussed, the public increasingly uses social media to obtain news and exchange information, 264 which has led some to contend that law enforcement officials can connect with citizens successfully only through social media. 265 Because social media is cheap and easy to use, 266 prosecutors can easily disseminate information about matters of public interest and potentially better reach more citizens more regularly than can be accomplished through traditional media, which may not provide complete coverage (or any coverage at all) on matters of public interest. 267 Furthermore, prosecutors can use social media to make statements that solicit responses from the community. 268 Unlike traditional media, social media provides for two-way communication. 269 Prosecutors therefore may use social media to engage with the public to assess community needs and concerns in a more impactful and direct way.
A more informed citizenry may result in further benefits to the prosecutor's office and to the public at large. More information about the nature of the prosecutorial function and the matters to which the prosecutor is attending can increase transparency and openness 270 as well as improve the public's perception of the prosecutor's office and the justice system as a whole. 271 Prosecutors' blogs, for example, can provide the public with a more comprehensive understanding of prosecutorial discretion and decision making. 272 Improved public perception of the prosecutor's office may have the added benefit of strengthening community ties and improving support for law enforcement, which may in turn help disincentivize criminal activity. 273 
Exacerbated Harms of Prosecutors' Extrajudicial Speech
Prosecutors' use of social media to make extrajudicial statements also exacerbates the potential harms stemming from prosecutors' speech. This section explores such risks, which include influencing a pending matter, imposing reputational harm on the accused, misleading the public, and tarnishing public perception of prosecutors or the justice system as a whole. 274 Prosecutors' use of social media increases the risk that their extrajudicial statements will affect a pending investigation or proceeding. 275 Traditionally, prosecutors avoid speaking about pending matters because the so-called "trial in the newspapers" routinely draws the ire of judges. 276 Press conferences and other announcements that attract journalists are typically reserved only for the most newsworthy cases once an indictment is filed, and rarely afterward. 277 Consequently, most matters do not generate much, if any, media attention. Social media, however, "has the potential to give many trials a higher profile than they might otherwise enjoy." 278 This is true even for seemingly mundane cases. 279 Further, given their public nature and ability to be "shared" or otherwise redistributed by members of the public, prosecutors' statements on social media have a nearly limitless reach 280 and are more permanent and accessible than prosecutors' statements published via traditional media reports. 281 Because citizens are becoming increasingly exposed to news coverage on social media, 282 prospective jurors are more likely to become aware of pre-trial publicity for a particular case. This risk may increase as citizens become more aware of the social media presence of their local prosecutors, whose social media posts they may elect to actively follow.
The risks of prosecutors' social media use to the fairness of a proceeding may persist even after jurors are selected and have been instructed by the judge not to discuss or conduct any research. 283 The ubiquity of social media and individuals' attachment to it increase the likelihood that jurors will violate instructions, either intentionally or accidentally. 284 Moreover, as social media statements are unfiltered and often one-sided, prospective and active jurors are also more likely to be exposed to editorialized coverage of the case through social media. This medium is more likely to influence jury deliberations than is traditional media coverage, which typically provides more balanced accounts of criminal matters. 285 Thus, prosecutors' statements on social media increase the likelihood that prospective or active jurors will view extraneous coverage of the trial.
Although there may be no constitutional deprivation of a right to a fair trial if prosecutors' extrajudicial statements do not impact the jury's deliberations, 286 substantial reputational harm on the accused. 287 Central to the American criminal justice system is the presumption that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty and that the sentence imposed upon an individual who has plead or been found guilty is the appropriate punishment for that individual's illegal conduct. 288 Given that social media activity is largely unmediated, permanent, and far-reaching, 289 prosecutors' statements may result in irreparable damage 290 that goes beyond the reputational harm that is an inevitable byproduct of the indictment itself. 291 Indeed, a simple internet search of the accused's name can instantly uncover harmful media coverage, even when the case occurred several years prior and the accused was ultimately not convicted. 292 Prosecutors' statements on social media also pose a greater risk of misleading the public and tarnishing public perception of the justice system. 293 As previously discussed, social media makes it much easier for prosecutors and non-prosecutors alike to publish information that is inaccurate. 294 Social media's perceived anonymity may breed indiscretion, 295 leading some to mistakenly believe that they can circumvent ethical rules so long as their statements remain anonymous. 296 Indeed, purported anonymity likely influenced the prosecutors in United States v. Bowen 297 when they decided to comment pseudonymously on the NOPD and the conduct of its officers. 298 Moreover, even social media activity that is not anonymous or misleading can compromise public perception of prosecutors, attorneys, and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. 299 Due to the ease of use and wide reach of social media, prosecutors' statements are more likely to be informal, impulsive, and arguably less professional than are statements made via traditional media. 300 This may lead the public to question the efficacy of its local prosecutors and the fairness of the justice process. 301 III. THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORS' EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL MEDIA As the public becomes more interested in the news 302 and increasingly skeptical of prosecutors and the justice system as a whole, 303 prosecutors and other government officials may need to take more meaningful steps to promote transparency and increase public confidence in the criminal justice system. Social media is a potential avenue through which prosecutors can achieve these goals successfully. 304 However, there is little doubt that prosecutors' use of social media may also exacerbate the harms of prosecutors' extrajudicial speech, including denying defendants' their right to due process, imposing undue reputational damage, misleading the public, and more. 305 As such, additional restraints are needed to curb the potential damage that social media can have on defendants, the public, and the justice system as a whole.
This Part argues that ABA Standards, state and local ethical rules, employer manuals like the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, and other resources that provide guidance on the prosecutorial function should include specific restraints on prosecutors' use of social media to maintain the balance between prosecutors' freedom of speech and the fair administration of justice in the social media age. Part III.A contends that prosecutors should not editorialize on social media. Part III.B advocates for restrictions on the content and timing of prosecutors' social media posts about pending matters. Part III.C addresses the need for restraints that promote professionalism. Finally, Part III.D argues that prosecutors should not post about pending cases or other aspects of their job without authorization or supervision.
A. Prosecutors Should Not Editorialize When Posting About Pending Cases
Prosecutors posting in either official or unofficial capacities on social media should not editorialize when making extrajudicial statements about pending cases. Prior to the growth of social media, prosecutors traditionally relied on old media to disseminate information to the public. 306 A prosecutor provided statements in a press release, in a news interview, or at a press conference. 307 A reporter would subsequently conduct further research. The final coverage would include parts of the prosecutor's statements alongside statements by others with information about the particular case. 308 Thus, any editorializing that the prosecutor may have engaged in would likely be counterbalanced by the reporter's other sources, making the prosecutor's editorializing less likely to raise due process or reputational concerns. 309 Social media, however, does not have these same checks. As previously discussed, social media platforms are unmediated, leaving prosecutors free to provide commentary about pending matters. 310 Any editorializing on social media stands alone on the prosecutor's official or unofficial social media page without being counterbalanced by statements from other sources, such as defense counsel. 311 Further, such statements can remain permanently on the prosecutor's social media page as well as on the pages of any social media users who "share" or repost the prosecutor's comments on their social media pages. 312 As prospective jurors and other members of the public can seek out this information or access it inadvertently, such statements may potentially influence the trial or impose greater reputational harm on the defendant. 313 Thus, while some editorializing may be acceptable at a press conference, it poses a substantial and unique risk of harm to the defendant and the functioning of the judicial process when articulated in the social media realm. 314 Consequently, prosecutors posting on social media in official or unofficial capacities should avoid editorializing when discussing pending matters.
B. The Content and Timing of Prosecutors' Social Media Posts About Pending Cases Should Be Restrained
The increased risk of harm to the defendant and the functioning of the judicial process also necessitate restraints on the content of prosecutors' social media posts about pending cases. Prosecutors should restrict the content of their social media posts to procedural information, such as the time and place of a particular proceeding that is open to the public, and factual information contained within the public record. 315 Furthermore, prosecutors should provide a neutral synopsis of the charge, including words such as "alleged," "accused," or "charged with," when discussing pending matters in order to reduce the risk of harm to the fair administration of justice or to the reputation of the defendant, as well as to avoid the appearance of partiality or unfairness. 316 For example, a tweet stating, "Man who committed 5 burglaries to be tried next month," is more likely to convey bias and produce harm than a tweet stating, "Man accused of 5 burglaries to be tried next month." Posted links should likewise be limited to publicly available news articles, press releases, and other documents that are also solely based on information contained within the public record. 317 Nevertheless, including links to neutral documents, "sprinkling the words 'allege(d)' or 'allegation(s)' liberally throughout" an extrajudicial statement, or "inserting a disclaimer that the accused is 'innocent unless and until proven guilty' at the end of an otherwise improper [statement]" will not "magically dispel[]" the prejudicial effect of otherwise improper extrajudicial commentary. 318 Thus, prosecutors and their offices should take steps to ensure that each isolated, pre-conviction statement on social media clearly conveys that the charges against the accused are merely allegations that have yet to be proven in court. 319 The timing of prosecutors' statements on social media should also be restrained. As previously discussed, traditionally prosecutors have tended not to speak about pending matters after an initial press conference upon filing an indictment to avoid the ire of judges. 320 Social media, however, enables prosecutors to provide continuous updates about a pending matter both before and during trial. 321 As continuous posting right before and during trial may draw publicity that could taint the fairness of the proceeding, prosecutors should not post on social media about pending cases from the beginning of jury selection until after the verdict is entered in order to reduce the likelihood of impacting a pending proceeding. 322 Any need to provide the public with information to further some legitimate law enforcement purpose can be conveyed through traditional media, which serves as a better check on prosecutors' statements during this period when the jurors are most susceptible to influence. 323 
C. Prosecutors' Social Media Posts Should Demonstrate Professionalism
Although the legal profession requires that all attorneys adhere to a certain level of professionalism, 324 demonstrating professionalism is especially important for prosecutors, "who are not only government officials but [are] also responsible for ensuring that justice is fairly administered." 325 Prosecutors who utilize social media, be it in an official or unofficial capacity, should therefore ensure that their posts are professional and do not undermine public perception of prosecutors or the legal profession as a whole. 326 Thus, in addition to posts about pending matters that are conveyed in a biased manner, 327 politically charged posts, like District Attorney Larson's Facebook posts regarding Eric Holder, 328 should generally be avoided, particularly when posted in an official capacity. Further, prosecutors should not forsake accuracy or completeness in order to adhere to social media norms such as brevity or speediness.
In addition to avoiding making statements that may undermine public perception of the profession, prosecutors can, and should, use social media to promote professionalism. 329 As previously discussed, prosecutors can use social media to inform the public and promote transparency, thereby building community relations and increasing public confidence in the profession. 330 Thus, prosecutors posting in an official capacity should be encouraged to provide information about the general nature of the justice process, initiatives on which the office is working, 331 and other matters of public interest 332 so long as their posts do not affect a pending proceeding or risk imposing additional reputational harm on the defendant. 333 
D. Unofficial, Unauthorized Posts Should Be Avoided
Additionally, prosecutors should not post on social media about cases or office operations without authorization or oversight. 334 Although blogging and other unauthorized social media activity by prosecutors may promote transparency by providing greater insight into the prosecutorial function, 335 the risk of posting in an unprofessional manner, be it about pending cases or other topics, is substantial. 336 Individuals posting in an official capacity are more likely to self-censor either by obtaining approval from their public relations team or by recognizing that their post reflects an official stance, which in turn may give individuals more reason to pause before posting than they would when posting in an unofficial capacity. As previously discussed, social media typically involves less inhibition than statements made through other mediums. 337 This is especially true when an individual is posting anonymously, after a long day of work, or during a quick break when they do not have time to thoroughly consider whether they should post a particular statement, all of which are characteristic of social media activity. Further, the effective permanence of posts on social media indicates that there is no turning back once a prosecutor has pressed "send," leaving the information readily accessible online even for months after the initial post. 338 Nevertheless, even if prosecutors do post on social media in an unofficial capacity, discussion of pending cases should be avoided, as should discussion of other aspects of the office that could be viewed as unprofessional. 339 Instead, prosecutors should confine their posts to general discussions about the law, the stages of the judicial process, and other aspects of the prosecutorial function that may promote transparency without hindering a particular defendant's reputation or right to due process, the fair administration of justice, or the public's view of the profession. 340 
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors' use of social media has destabilized the balance that was previously struck between prosecutors' First Amendment right to free speech and defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law. Although prosecutors' use of social media can promote transparency, which is arguably much needed to engender greater public confidence in prosecutors and the justice system as a whole, social media exacerbates longstanding concerns regarding prosecutors' extrajudicial statements. The vast differences between traditional media and social media, including the way in which social media is far-reaching, unmediated, informal, and uniquely permanent, increase the likelihood that prosecutors' extrajudicial speech will harm the defendant, the fair administration of justice, and public perception of the legal profession. Thus, additional restraints are needed to restore the free speech/fair trial balance and promote professionalism in the social media age.
